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I. Introduction
Korea and Japan are two key allies of the United States in East Asia. These 
two countries are “window models” of postwar democratization and economic 
advancement in a free world. Sustained security provision of the United States 
to these two allies during and after the Cold War period provided a stage for 
upgrading their global status as well as enhancing the quality of life of the people 
of the two countries.
For the past 43 years, since Korea and Japan normalized their relationship in 
1965, cooperative ties between the two countries have leaped forward. In 1965, 
the number of people visiting the other country was approximately 10,000. In 
2006, 4.46 million people visited each other, which means that more than 10,000 
Japanese and Korean people have been entering the two countries in a single 
day. In 1965, bilateral trade between the two countries was only $240 million. 
In 2006, trade between the two was recorded at $78.5 billion. The “Korean 
wave,” or hallyu, is so widespread that Japanese housewives and youngsters are 
fascinated by Korean movie stars. Increasing number of Japanese style izakaya 
are found in Seoul.1 These are living examples of deepening ties between Korea 
and Japan.
However, frictions between the two countries have never faded away. We fi nd 
more, not fewer, instances of history-related frictions since the mid-1990s. History 
textbook controversies, Yasukuni shrine visits, and Dokdo/Takeshima disputes 
galvanize both the Korean and Japanese publics. Anti-Japanese sentiments in 
Korea are not necessarily on the rise, but reactions to the Japanese provocations 
are becoming intensifi ed (Park 2008b, 5–30). Also unlike the Cold War period 
when both Korea and Japan antagonized North Korea, the two countries have 
acquired diverging perceptions of the North Korean threat during the past decade. 
This laid the groundwork for submerged but potential confl ict.
There is no doubt that cooperation has increased and deepened during the past 
few decades, but frictions persist. What is going to happen in the future of 
the Korea-Japan relationship? Is cooperation between the two promised? Or 
is confl ict unavoidable? In a word, where to from here? These are profound 
questions that this article tries to address.
As for the future of the Korea-Japan strategic relationship, opinions are divided 
and empirical realities are mixed and complex. Assuming that theories can 
1. Izakaya is a Japanese-style pub restaurant. 
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work as a guiding light to navigate through the unknown future, I would like to 
address this puzzle from an analytical point of view. I will apply contemporary 
international relations theories—realism, liberalism, and constructivism—to 
the future of Korea-Japan relations and interpret mixed signals with a prism of 
theoretical perspectives. After reviewing both optimistic and pessimistic views 
drawn from diverse perspectives, I would like to draw out a synthesis that stands 
on cautious optimism.
II. Where To from Here: Contending Perspectives and         
Mixed Signals
There is no consensus about what is going to happen in the future of Korea-
Japan relations. Hopes for the future are abundant. Expectations for upgraded 
and future-oriented ties have been voiced many times. However, troubles that 
twisted the relationship between the two countries have existed at all times. From 
time to time hopeful expectations turned into despair. Also, omens suggesting 
the worst case often preempted discussions between the two countries.
As the backdrop for the unfolding realities in recent times, this article highlights 
logical and empirical grounds for optimism as well as pessimism about the 
prospects for future bilateral ties between Korea and Japan. Realists, liberals, 
and constructivists prescribe different versions of cooperation as well as confl ict 
between the two countries in the coming years.
Liberal Optimism
Liberals present an optimistic view about international relations. They focus on 
economic interdependence, regime type, and institutional linkage. Most of all, 
they highlight the so-called pacifying effects of liberal institutional linkage and 
socioeconomic transactions.
Economic interdependence is widely known as a factor facilitating cooperation 
among nations (Copeland). Keohane and Nye (1977) addressed this issue earlier 
and argued that cooperation is likely to emerge when interdependence deepens 
among nations. If we follow this logic, Korea and Japan are more likely to 
cooperate. Trade interdependence is peculiar between the two countries. Japan 
is the largest import partner to South Korea. Japan also constitutes the third-
largest export partner to South Korea. Japan is also a country that invests in 
Korea more than other countries.
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Liberals also take note of the nature of a regime. Widely known is the democratic 
peace theory, that is, liberals argue that democracies do not fi ght each other 
(Russet 1993). Korea and Japan are outstanding democratic countries with market 
economic systems. Because of the similar quality of the two governments and 
economic systems, the two countries have little incentive to fi ght each other.
The third element for liberal optimism is the role of international institutions. 
International institutions help to improve communication between states, 
reducing uncertainty about intentions and increasing the capacity of governments 
to make credible, binding commitments to one another (Keohane 1984; Martin 
and Simmons 1998, 729–57). Liberal optimists note that Korea and Japan join 
multiple, multilayered, and multifunctional international institutions together. 
Because of their coaffi liation in international institutions, Korea and Japan have 
acquired habits of cooperation through regularized norms of international society. 
Working in institutional settings like the Asia-Pacifi c Economic Cooperation, 
ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN Plus Three, and others, Korea and Japan have 
learned how to adapt to international situations in an accommodative manner.
Despite these optimistic prescriptions, counterfactual assumptions are also 
presented. First of all, people are skeptical about the spillover effect of economic 
interdependence, which is linked to the point that issue linkage should not be 
exaggerated. Issues are, liberals presume, so interconnected that cooperation in 
one area will produce positive side effects in the other issue areas of cooperation. 
However, a reality check of this theory demonstrates that issue linkage is often 
limited. Economic cooperation, if full-blown, is expected to spill over to other 
areas of cooperation. However, no one can authoritatively judge when the point 
of conversion will come and where the threshold lies. The fact of the matter is 
that, despite increasing economic interdependence, confl icts regarding historical 
contentions are unending.
Second, there is no denying that democracies have little reason to fi ght each other. 
War is not likely among democracies, but this does not mean that democracies 
are confl ict-free. Political leaders in a democratic setting are not immune to the 
confl ictive claims between countries. More often than not, democratic leaders 
are sensitive to public opinions of domestic constituencies. If opinions prevail 
in a way that corners political leaders to stand upright, democratic leaders’ realm 
of choice is confi ned by them.
Furthermore, despite frequent interactions between the two countries, there are 
no binding rules that Korean and Japanese leaders should expect a penalty for 
unacceptable behavior. Institutional interactions have not been fully internalized 
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yet. As long as binding rules that constrain leaders of the two countries are absent, 
Korean and Japanese leaders will look to domestic political opinion rather than 
an institutional mandate for cooperation that might be merely symbolic.
Also, deepening interdependence does not necessarily mean the equal sharing 
of vulnerability and sensitivity. Though Keohane and Nye (1977) suggest that a 
sense of vulnerability leads to cooperation, a country with the upper hand would 
be less constrained by this logic. In its extreme case, one country’s sense of 
dependency can generate distrust in the other, which can evolve into confl icts. 
Although the liberal optimistic view is grounded in the concept of rationality and 
exchange of interests, historical records illustrate that emotions and perceptions 
intervene in international politics (Jervis 1976).
In general, liberal optimism accounts for the long-term upward progress in 
Korea-Japan relations. However, liberal optimism cannot explain why there are 
still recurring cycles of friction. Despite, not because of, the presence of liberal 
elements, Korea and Japan have at times been immersed in confl ict.
Liberal Pessimism
Not all liberals are optimistic. Liberal elements can work as a stumbling block 
for cooperation. Aaron Friedberg (1993) argued that the East Asian region lacks 
the pacifying institutional elements that are often found in Western Europe. 
He puts emphasis on the lack, not the malfunction, of liberal elements. As a 
result, he claims, East Asia is ripe for rivalry rather than cooperation. In other 
words, liberal moments have not arrived yet. At best, the development of liberal 
elements is at the incipient stage. Jones and Smith argue, in connection with 
regional integration, that Asia is making only process, not progress (Jones and 
Smith 2007, 148–84). Although institutional arrangements have been made, trust 
building has not taken root to the point of reducing uncertainties among nations. 
Asian countries, including Korea and Japan, are making ritualistic commitments 
rather than trying to produce tangible results of cooperation. If we extend this 
logic, institutions are not guarantors of cooperation.
Dependence, not interdependence, also matters. In particular, Korea runs a 
huge trade defi cit with Japan. As this is a structural problem, the defi cit is likely 
to increase as Korean exports grow. This is so because Korea imports parts, 
machinery, and materials from Japan.2 Although the existence of a trade defi cit 
2. President Lee Myung-bak of Korea raised this question offi cially during the summits with Prime 
Minister Yasuo Fukuda of Japan in February and April 2008.
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does not preclude the possibility of cooperation, it can work as a stumbling block 
for deepening collaboration.
Furthermore, because Korea and Japan are democratic countries, they are more 
apt to be vulnerable to changing public opinion. Sensitivity to public opinion can 
lead to unexpected troubles, which may preempt the potential for cooperation 
between political leaders.
One does not have to remain pessimistic because of the immature development 
or lack of liberal elements. First, unlike the seemingly laggard development 
of institutions, institutional cooperation in East Asia is intensifying. Among 
ASEAN Plus Three countries, of which Korea and Japan are a part, intraregional 
trade and investment are growing. Institutional collaboration is becoming 
more multilayered, agendas for cooperation are becoming more concrete, and 
leaders meet more frequently than before (Kim 2008). Analysis of the internal 
processes of institutional cooperation attests to the case that Korea and Japan 
are institutionally bound. One can hardly think of the two countries opting out 
of the process.
Second, dependence and interdependence are not mutually exclusive. Because 
economic transactions are not exclusively bilateral, global export targeting can 
weaken the effects of dependency. In other words, economic growth is still 
possible although a country may be more reliant upon other parties in terms 
of their export markets as well as import sources. In reality, the case of Korea 
illustrates such a case in its trading regime (Haggard 1990).
Democracy may function negatively because of the overriding weight of public 
opinion in a country. However, public opinion is not stagnant but varying. Public 
opinion can turn sour for a certain period of time, but then the furor settles down 
and discussion returns to a normal tone with the passage of time. A high number 
of exchanges and transactions in diverse arenas can also tame the elements of 
confl ict between two countries, too.3
Constructivist Pessimism
Constructivists highlight the subjective side of international relations as well 
as the interactive composition of realities. Socially constructed perceptions and 
mental structure work as a guiding principle of the relationships among countries 
3. When confl icts between Korea and Japan were expected in July 2008, a number of Korean leaders 
in various circles, including bureaucratic, political, business, and scholarly circles, traveled to Japan 
to interact with their Japanese counterparts. This is a show of the willingness to cooperate.
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(Wendt 1992). Perceptions and images are historically made and socially defi ned. 
They do not change easily. Also, depending on the nature of interaction among 
nations, particular images and perceptions can be consolidated or redefi ned. 
Interaction itself does not defi ne the relationship, but the nature of the interaction 
can shape the direction of the relationship.
Pessimists in the constructivist circle focus on the “hardening” effects of existing 
perceptions and images (Friedberg 2005). Socially constructed identity prevents 
East Asian countries from moving forward in various areas of cooperation. 
According to Thomas Berger (2003, 387–420), in the post–Cold War context, 
collectively shared memories work as a negative factor that disrupts the 
relationship among East Asian countries. “Wounded nationalism” fi nds its way 
into confl icts among nations in East Asia. Korean national identity at its core 
incorporates an anti-Japanese stance. Korean identity that is founded on anti-
Japanese feeling is an everlasting source of confl ict and friction between Korea 
and Japan.
Constructivists also shed light on the hardening effects of rituals and repeated 
interactions. Politically symbolic rituals can strengthen misperceptions among 
nations. The Yasukuni shrine visits by Japanese prime ministers are a good 
example. For the Japanese leaders, visiting the Yasukuni shrine may be a political 
ritual to satisfy conservative domestic constituencies. In the eyes of the Koreans 
and Chinese, however, the same ritual can be interpreted as a political gesture to 
justify the war and colonialism of the past because 14 A-class war criminals are 
enshrined in the Yasukuni shrine. This daunting perception gap between Japan 
and Korea has served as a barrier to the betterment of ties.
The unexpected development of crises and events can also mold negative 
perceptions in the course of interaction among nations. Often problematic 
remarks by political leaders twist misperceptions between the countries. For 
example, a few Japanese leaders repeatedly argue that Japan did good things, not 
only bad things, to Korea during the colonial period. On the part of the formerly 
victimized nation, this remark sounds as if Japan is not genuinely apologetic for 
the wrongdoings in the past. We fi nd numerous occasions when Japanese political 
leaders’ remarks have exacerbated the problematic parts of the relationship 
between Korea and Japan. More often than not, Japanese arrogance stimulates 
Korean prejudice against Japan, which eventually escalates any existing confl icts 
between the two countries.
Despite the legitimacy of constructivist pessimists’ claims, it is noteworthy that 
those who distort perceptions in a negative way do not make up the majorities 
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in either society. The vast majority of Koreans and Japanese still aspire to 
upgraded partnership between the two countries. A gradual increase in positive 
perceptions toward Koreans among the Japanese, which is verifi ed by an opinion 
survey conducted by the Cabinet Offi ce of Japan, shows the changed perceptions 
among the Japanese.4 
Also noteworthy is the dwindling negative emotional responses in Korea to 
Japanese actions, believe it or not. In times past, if Japan provoked the Korean 
side, demonstrations on the street would surge over an extended period of time 
in widely dispersed areas. Nowadays, however, anti-Japanese demonstrations 
are confi ned to limited areas such as in front of the Japanese embassy in Seoul. 
They do not proliferate into other areas as well. Neither do they continue for 
a long period of time. Emotional responses may surge at one point, but they 
evaporate after a while.
Historical comparison enables us to see that issue linkage between past history 
and today’s cooperative agendas is becoming remote, not closer. In the mid-
1990s, if an issue of the two countries’ historical past surfaced, both governments 
refused to talk and stopped their cooperative projects by linking the history issue 
with other issues. But, recently, the history issue has been contained separately 
from other cooperative projects. The year 2005, which was a Korea-Japan 
friendship year celebrating the 40th anniversary of diplomatic normalization, is 
a good example. In 2005, the Dokdo/Takeshima controversies between Korea 
and Japan imperiled the smooth progress of the relationship. But even in the 
middle of that confl ictive controversy, numerous projects celebrating the 40-year 
ties between the two countries proceeded as planned.
Therefore, one does not have to remain overly pessimistic about the future of 
the Korea-Japan relationship.
Constructivist Optimism
Although optimistic constructivists highlight perceptions, identity, and socially 
constructed norms as pessimistic constructivists do, they remain optimistic about 
the future of the Korea-Japan relationship. They shed light on the softening 
nature of interaction between the two countries.
4. At public opinion polls conducted by the Cabinet Offi ce in Japan, the ratio of the Japanese who have 
favorable feelings toward Korea steadily increased from 35.8% in 1996, 50.3% in 2001, and to 57.1% 
in 2008. On the other hand, the ratio of the Japanese who do not have favorable feeling decreased from 
59.9% in 1996, 45.5% in 2001, and to 40.9% in 2008. Refer to a home page of the Cabinet Offi ce of 
Japan, http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey. (Accessed on January 16, 2009). 
17149_101-118.indd   108 3/16/2009   4:11:13 PM
                 Shifting Strategic and Political Relations with the Koreas        109
First of all, elevated images and perceptions about each other have been grounds 
for optimism. In the process of long-term interaction between Korea and Japan, 
people have obtained positive images about the other party. Prejudices and biases 
are being dismantled, though gradually. One can hardly fi nd any Japanese person 
who calls a Korean chosenjin as they did in the past. The term chokkbari, which 
was a pejorative slang term to refer to the Japanese in the past, is rarely spoken 
in Korea these days. Korean kimchi, which was thought to be a disgusting-
smelling food from an unknown country, is found in local supermarkets in 
Japan. Japanese tourists wander around the city of Seoul without reservation 
about speaking Japanese in public.
Second, despite socially shared mental barriers like anti-Japanese feelings, 
initiatives for future-oriented ties between Korea and Japan have been repeatedly 
raised by almost every Korean president since the mid-1990s. This signifi es 
that people in both countries are ready to accept such rhetoric. J. J. Suh (2007, 
382–402) suggests that even the confl ictive dialogue about past history between 
Korea and Japan can develop into a regional communicative dialogue. He is 
not pessimistic at all about the confl ictive nature of dialogue. For him, dialogue 
in any form is better than the lack of dialogue. According to Suh, the gradual 
learning process can serve as a springboard for a better future.
These optimistic prescriptions, however, cannot be justifi ed as they are. There 
remain concerns despite optimistic signals.
First, although perceptions about each other are improving over time, they 
can worsen at any time. Positive perceptions have not been solidly rooted or 
unchangeably consolidated. When the ties between the two countries become 
turbulent, especially related to the emotionally touchy history issues, negative 
perceptions surge to the surface.
Also, initiatives for future-oriented ties between Korea and Japan have often 
degenerated into confl icts in the middle or at the end of a presidential term. 
President Kim Young-sam of Korea adopted a future-oriented initiative between 
Korea and Japan. But around 1995, when Japanese cabinet members commented 
on the legality of Japan’s past Korean annexation and the positive effects of the 
colonial rule, confl icts began. The time in offi ce of Kim Dae-jung and Keizo 
Obuchi was rather an exception in maintaining favorable ties, but even the Kim 
Dae-jung administration took a critical stance toward Japan when the Yoshiro 
Mori and Junichiro Koizumi cabinets endorsed the review in 2001 of a textbook 
that contained right-wing elements. Roh Moo-hyun started with future-oriented 
agendas toward Japan and even said during a summit in Jeju in July 2004 that 
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he would not raise the history issue during his tenure. However, as soon as the 
Dokdo issue came to the fore, around March 2005, the Korea-Japan relationship 
turned extremely volatile.
Learning history from a new perspective by the next generation is a source of 
concern, unlike constructivist optimism. Japanese conservatives try to revise 
textbooks in a way that resurrects national prestige and esteem. This entails the 
possibility of widening the perception gap between the Koreans and the Japanese. 
This may lead to repeated and extended hardening over generations. What Suh 
calls regional communicative dialogue has not fully materialized.
Thus, socially constructed identity, norms, and perceptions have dual possibilities. 
They can open a road for optimism. But at the same time a pessimistic view is 
not groundless.
Realist Optimism
Realists are interested in power-centered relationships among countries. 
Positional interests at the system level, defi ned by the capability of a country, is 
for them a guiding principle of international relations. In a system where world 
government does not exist, a nation’s survival interest and the security dilemma 
derived from it shapes the nature of interstate relationships. The problem of 
relative gains makes it diffi cult for countries to cooperate with each other. As 
a result, realists are relatively pessimistic about cooperation among countries, 
but, as Jervis (1988, 317–49) argues, cooperation is possible under the security 
dilemma.
Optimists in the realism school hint at the possibility of “muted” confl icts 
between Korea and Japan. Realists remain optimistic about Korea-Japan relations 
mostly because of U.S. engagement. Korea and Japan are two key allies of the 
United States. As democratic nations with market economies under the U.S. 
security umbrella, the two countries would not enter into military confl icts. 
Korea and Japan may fall into the trap of frictions from time to time, but they 
are highly unlikely to fi ght against each other because the two countries are 
what Victor Cha (1999) calls “virtual allies.” Because of their indirect security 
connection through the United States, the security dilemma between Korea and 
Japan is muted.
Realists also take seriously the role of the United States in managing the 
relationship between the two countries. Utilizing the quasi-alliance model, 
Cha (1999) claims that Korea and Japan are more likely to cooperate when the 
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United States signals the withdrawal of security commitment. Both nations 
would fear being abandoned by the United States and they are more prone to 
cooperation. In contrast with Cha, who advocated the gradual fi nality option as 
the U.S. strategy, Woo (2003, 129–50) suggests that Korea and Japan are more 
likely to cooperate when the United States engages. In any case, optimists in the 
realist school highly appreciate the positive function of the U.S. security nexus 
in managing Korea-Japan relations.
Optimists among realists also focus on the limited strategic aims of Japan. Unlike 
those who argue Japan’s superpower orientation, Soeya (2005) maintains that 
Japan has been, is, and will be a middle power. Although Japan’s economic 
capability is number two in the world, he argues, Japan would remain a country 
of reserved middle power diplomacy without superpower orientation. Japan 
would not aspire to be a global superpower. Hence, Korea would feel comfortable 
about a Japan that is confi ned to limited strategic purposes.
Also in terms of military capability, realist optimists imply, Japan will not easily 
equip itself with global power projection capability (Lind 2004). Because of its 
national security culture, Japan is not likely to arm itself with nuclear weapons, 
aircraft carriers, and intercontinental ballistic missiles (Hughes 2007, 67–96). 
Furthermore, even though Japan’s military capability is upgraded, Japan would 
not carelessly categorize Korea as an enemy of Japan. In particular, as long as 
the United States maintains an alliance partnership with Korea and Japan, the 
two countries will work as cooperative partners. In that sense, cooperation is 
promised.
A closer look at the realities suggests, however, that cooperation is not fully 
guaranteed. Unlike the rational expectations of realist optimism, the possibility 
of unwanted and unintended military confl icts between Korea and Japan cannot 
be discounted. Escalation of confl icts concerning Dokdo/Takeshima are a 
possible place. In 2005, when Japan dispatched a coastal guard ship to the Dokdo 
area, crisis was imminent. Military tension is probable in the context of rising 
nationalism related to territorial sovereignty. Emotional confl icts charged with 
nationalist fervor, if not controlled properly, can lead to irrational behaviors.
The perception, not the reality, of Japan as a rapidly emerging regional military 
power can reshape the mind-set of the Korean people. Remaining suspicion over 
Japanese intent as well as a lack of full-fl edged trust in the Japanese purpose can 
lead to spirals of prolonged confl icts between the two countries. An assertive 
and proactive Japan may serve U.S. interests in East Asia (Green 2007), but this 
does not necessarily serve South Korea’s interests. Without transparency and 
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accountability to neighboring countries, a Japanese assertive move, especially 
in the security arena, could bring about a vicious cycle of suspicion and loss of 
confi dence between the two.
Realist Pessimism
Pessimists in the realist school look at the role of the United States in Korea-
Japan relations in a different way. Unlike optimists who generally appreciate the 
positive impact of U.S. engagement for Korea-Japan relations, pessimists imply 
that the United States has little control over bilateral issues between Korea and 
Japan. The United States cannot force the two countries to cooperate with each 
other. Nor can the United States prevent frictions between the two. The role of 
the United States is important, but it is not a determinant of the Korea-Japan 
relationship (Yoon 2007, 169–205). There is an independent logic of Korea-Japan 
relations detached from U.S. infl uence. In particular, the United States cannot 
solve confl icts between Korea and Japan stemming from the legacy of the past. 
In contrast with Cha’s prediction, confl icts may deteriorate if the United States 
hints at the possibility of pulling out from the region.
Pessimists also notice the implication of the potential power transition of Japan. 
From the realist standpoint, it would not be unusual at all for Japan, with its 
immense economic capability, to transfer its power resources to the military 
arena (Gilpin 1981). Like other countries with economic capabilities, it is only 
a matter of time before Japan makes a power transition as well (Waltz 1993, 
44–79). Although Japan continues to support the United States, it can aspire to 
be a regional hegemon or a normal superpower. In other words, Japan can be 
an aspiring revisionist country in the region. Korea would feel uneasy about a 
militarily active Japan, which leads to confl ictive ties.
Increasing voices for Japan’s becoming a normal country with an independent 
military capability are often cited as a movement for Japan’s march toward 
superpower status. Previously unheard arguments for an autonomous Japan 
are surfacing more frequently in Japan (Samuels 2007). Japan as a nonnuclear 
peaceful nation that refuses to dispatch its Self-Defense Forces overseas is a story 
of the past. In the diplomatic arena, Japan aspires to be a global partner of the 
United States. International security, which goes well beyond national security, 
has become an integral part of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces’ mission.
Korea is not always wary of Japanese moves toward defensive realism although 
Japanese power untied from the United States or untamed by the security alliance 
with the United States could be a threat to Korea. In fact, an increasing number 
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of Koreans are perceiving Japan as a threat. Underlying the concern is the deeply 
rooted suspicion over Japanese strategic intent.
The diverging strategic aims of the two countries since the end of the Cold War 
has set another stage for mutual confl ict. In particular, Korea and Japan have 
developed different threat perceptions of North Korea. In the eyes of Koreans, 
North Korea, which is economically troubled and politically volatile, is perceived 
as a lesser threat to Korean security compared with the threat of the past. In 
contrast, in the eyes of the Japanese, North Korea is perceived as a real security 
threat to Japan, especially since the Taepo-dong missile launch and the issue of 
Japanese abductees. As a result, cooperative potential in the area of security is 
less than before.
Those who are inclined to support realist pessimism count too much on the 
skewed interpretation of the Japanese defense buildup and the domestic political 
atmosphere. Japan is not necessarily pursuing the goal of becoming another 
superpower in the region. Much more likely is a Japanese version of becoming 
a British-style coalition partner of the United States (Inoguchi and Bacon 2008, 
79–98). This is not a harmful strategic option in Korea’s eyes.
Japan is perceived as a perilous gambler if we turn our ears to the voices of right-
wing-oriented people in the Japanese political arena. However, right wingers are 
not a majority in Japan. Neither are their voices refl ected in policy decisions, as 
they claim. Also, despite an elevated role for Japan in international security and 
other global businesses, Japan is not likely to give up its peaceful orientation as 
well as civilian control of the military.
Furthermore, in the foreseeable future, Korea and Japan have more to defend 
together than they have for pursuing their independent strategic goals. Their 
perceptions of threats from North Korea and China may vary, but Korea and Japan 
have more to lose unless they cooperate with each other in Northeast Asia.
A tightening security alliance between the United States and Japan is not a source 
of worry for Korea. Rather, the security commitment of the United States to 
Japan works as a pacifying element for the security dilemma between Korea and 
Japan. Without the U.S. security commitment, Korea and Japan might balance 
each other (Cha 1999; Yoon 2007; Park 2008a). Therefore, the U.S. security 
provision in the region should be welcomed not only for the stability of the 
entire region but also for the stable management of the bilateral relationship 
between Korea and Japan.
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III. Synthesis: Grounds for Cautious Optimism
We have reviewed contending perspectives and mixed signals related to the 
future of the Korea-Japan strategic relationship. How then can we discover 
diverging trends? Is cooperation doomed or promised? Is confl ict inevitable or 
manageable? I will now set out the argument for cautious optimism.
If constructive pessimists prevail, Korea-Japan relations would be expected 
to deteriorate over time. Rather than moving forward, Korea-Japan ties would 
degenerate into prolonged confl icts if the pessimists’ prediction is right. In 
other words, Korea-Japan relations would show a downward spiral. However, 
the historical record shows that Korea-Japan relations have improved over time 
although there have been twists and turns. Areas of cooperation have expanded 
in the past few decades. Transactions expanded rapidly. Exchanges have been 
dramatically enlarged.
Also, without the promise of optimism, Korea-Japan relations may have remained 
stagnant without showing any change, upward or downward. Again the history of 
Korea-Japan relations illustrates that they have never remained fl at. If historical 
animosity works as a primary variable that infl uences the bilateral ties between 
Korea and Japan, the two countries would be antagonists for longer periods 
of time without showing any signs of cooperation. But, as Victor Cha (1999) 
showed, alignment despite antagonism was the reality during the Cold War 
period. Despite continued ups and downs, the Korea-Japan relationship showed 
a general upward movement.
This does not mean that bilateral ties between Korea and Japan have upgraded 
in a single, unbroken line. The relationship between the two countries has often 
been interrupted by troubled times and turbulent periods when frictions rose to 
the surface. However, these frictions subdued after momentary confl icts. In other 
words, frictions are not a constant feature of the relationship. Nor are frictions 
the representative feature of the relationship. While Korea-Japan relations 
move in a upward direction, the two countries have often faced unexpected and 
mutually unintended cycles of frictions. Hence, the bilateral ties between Korea 
and Japan should not be understood as simply reproducing cycles of cooperation 
and confl ict.
Therefore, what we see in reality is long-term progress toward an upward move 
interrupted by recurring frictions in the short-term (Yoon 2007). It is fair to say 
that elements of liberal optimism and realist optimism generally contributed 
to the upward move. Increasing transactions, assimilating values and systems, 
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and security ties mediated through the United States have worked toward an 
upgraded relationship over time. Elements of constructivist optimism are yet to 
come. Although positive dialogue channels are developing in the region, full-
scale regional communicative dialogues have not materialized fully yet. Still 
we have reason to believe that current cooperative trends toward an upgraded 
strategic partnership will not be reversed easily. This provides us with grounds 
for optimism.
Why should we remain cautious about the future of Korea-Japan relations? It is 
because a cooperative strategic relationship does not arrive naturally with the 
passage of time. Also there are many hurdles that both nations need to overcome. 
Elements related to constructivist pessimism drag down cooperative moves 
occasionally, though not always. New identity building for escalating national 
pride can hurt the feelings of neighbors. Remarks or rituals serving domestic 
political constituencies can provoke the formerly victimized country. If not 
properly managed, repeated interaction can fortify misconceptions or biases 
already held by the people. Identities, images, and perceptions are all malleable. 
They are in a sense volatile. If political leaders of both countries remain cautious, 
mutual provocations can be prevented or at least managed. This is why we 
remain cautious but not necessarily pessimistic. Simply speaking, beliefs are 
not unchangeable. If leaders of both countries agree to control changes, it is not 
impossible to manipulate the situation to the benefi t of both Korea and Japan.
In the post–Cold War context, elements of realist pessimism, often packed into 
misperceptions about each other, have added to the tones of confl icts ignited by 
nationalist emotional confl icts. Elements of liberal pessimism do not constitute 
major barriers to cooperation although they suggest increasing areas of mutual 
coordination in the years to come.
Past trends will basically continue in the future. Hence, the future of the Korea-
Japan strategic relationship is likely to be affected by various factors coming from 
diverse sources. Whether Korea and Japan can maximize the effects of optimism 
while they effectively minimize the impacts of pessimism will determine the 
nature of the strategic ties between the two countries. An optimistic future does 
not arrive naturally or automatically. Neither do pessimistic elements decrease 
with the passage of time. A cooperative future should be of what countries in the 
region make of it, as anarchy is of what states make of it (Wendt 1992). 
To facilitate cooperation between Korea and Japan in the future, several policy 
measures should be introduced. First, historical controversies should be managed 
properly by political leaders. Historical memory cannot be cured or deleted. It is 
17149_101-118.indd   115 3/16/2009   4:11:14 PM
116 U.S.–Korea Academic Symposium
hard to reach mutually satisfactory solutions to this problem. However, reaching 
a consensus about not provoking each other as well as nonproliferation of the 
confl ictive situation is not impossible.
Second, together with controlling negative effects of historical debates, 
transactions and exchanges between Korea and Japan should be widened and 
deepened. Functional cooperation alone cannot completely fulfi ll the goal of 
building trust between suspicious friends, but, when combined with managing 
historical controversies, socioeconomic cooperation will help to alleviate the 
burden of history.
Third, the continued engagement of the United States in the region is crucial 
not only for alleviating the security dilemma between the two countries but also 
for developing a reliable partnership between the two. In particular, the United 
States should not try to take one side at the expense of the other. Instead, the 
United States should place itself evenly in both Korea and Japan.
Fourth, eventually, in order to establish long-term cooperative ties between 
Korea and Japan, the two countries are highly encouraged to develop their 
common vision of the future. Sharing strategic goals in the region and fi nding 
ways to carry out those goals together will enhance the potential for deepened 
cooperation.
Finally, Japan and Korea should work to achieve cooperation in the multilateral or 
minilateral setting as a way to soften confl icts and upgrade cooperative ties.
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